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Recent legislation has cleared the way for subsidized livestock price insurance.  Such programs 
could increase production.  Expected feeder cattle prices with and without subsidized insurance 
will be analyzed using E-V and Stochastic Dominance.  Results will highlight the potential 
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Introduction 
  Over the past few years, there has been a noticeable change in agricultural policy that has 
involved expanding the role of risk management and insurance.  Subsidized crop insurance that 
insures either crop yields or revenues has been the focus of much legislation and debate.  In 
general, crop insurance programs involve government subsidies to producers to cover a portion 
of insurance premiums along with reinsurance (and, in some cases, direct subsidies) to private 
firms that provide the insurance.  While these programs offer farmers a means of risk 
management, they have often been costly and have drawn criticism for the incentives that they 
create (Skees 1999b, Turvey).  Recent legislation has now cleared the way to introduce similar 
insurance programs for livestock.  Like crop insurance programs, these programs have the 
potential to establish risk sharing markets that will allow producers to manage net income risk 
associated with livestock production and, if subsidized by the government, also have the 
potential to introduce perverse incentives to livestock producers.  With this in mind, it is 
worthwhile to carefully evaluate the situation of livestock producers and the potential effects of 
subsidized livestock insurance.  This paper will do just that by comparing the risk faced by 
livestock producers with no insurance, fairly priced insurance, and subsidized insurance. 
  Livestock producers, like all farmers, must make decisions in a risky environment and 
will make decisions based upon the level of risk present and their individual attitude toward risk 
(Anderson, Dillon, and Hardaker, Boisvert and McCarl; Hardaker, Huirne, and Anderson; 
Robison and Barry).  Given the lack of vertical integration or cooperation in the beef industry, 
beef producers generally have limited opportunity to share the risk of their respective operations 
and are left to design individual risk management strategies.  One type of risk that greatly 
influences profitability is marketing or price risk.  Futures market hedging and cash forward   2 
contracting provide opportunities to manage price risk.  However, these alternatives come at a 
cost.  For example, futures options offer a mechanism to establish a price floor for some 
premium.  If futures markets function efficiently, this premium reflects the true value of the 
option.  Producers realize that they will not always exercise these options and therefore in some 
years will actually forgo income in exchange for being insured against possible loss. Thus, the 
option premium (and therefore the risk it is priced to manage) is internalized into their decision-
making process.  In general, the premiums a producer will expect to pay are at least as much as 
the payments they realize, over the long run.  The same can be said for actuarially fair price 
insurance, which functions much like a European option and can only be exercised when it 
expires.  As long as these instruments are fairly priced, decision makers will choose to utilize 
them or not based upon their individual risk preference.  Specifically, more risk averse producers 
will forgo a larger proportion of expected income to realize a given decrease in the variability of 
that income. 
  If the same risk management instruments are offered with subsidized premiums, the true 
risk is not internalized into the decision-making process and as a result, producers will be 
inclined to take on more risk than they would with fairly priced insurance (Skees 1999a).  In the 
case of beef production, this can mean producing more beef and/or producing beef under riskier 
conditions.  As producers realize that the true value of the insurance is greater than the amount 
they must pay, they are likely to expand their operations to levels that result in their being 
exposed to the same level of risk as they were prior to the subsidy.  This behavior has been 
shown in some studies regarding subsidized crop insurance and crop production (Skees1999a 
and 1999b, Turvey).   3 
  The general goal of this study is to highlight the effects of government subsidized 
insurance on the actual risk faced by livestock producers.  Specifically, this paper will simulate 
three possible marketing alternatives that a livestock producers might face: (1) selling feeder 
cattle with no means of price protection, (2) purchasing actuarially fair European put options, 
and (3) purchasing insurance in the form of European put options with a portion of the premium 
subsidized by the government.  Each alternative will then be ranked according to its risk 
efficiency for a variety of risk attitudes ranging from risk preferring to risk neutral to risk averse.  
This ranking will be done using Expected Value Variance (E-V) Analysis and Stochastic 
Dominance Criteria.  Results from both dominance analyses will be of interest to policy makers 
wishing to implement programs that allow livestock producers to manage marketing risk while 
introducing appropriate incentives to these producers.  Results from the E-V analysis will help to 
approximate how much producers of different risk attitudes will value a government subsidy on 
the insurance premium. 
  To complete this analysis, it will be necessary to present a brief review of choice under 
uncertainty.  This will be followed by an explanation of how the three previously mentioned 
marketing alternatives of a livestock producer are simulated.  The three alternatives can then be 
ranked and the results of this ranking can be discussed and conclusions can be drawn.  
 
Conceptual Framework 
  It is widely agreed upon in agricultural economic literature that agricultural production 
decisions are made in an uncertain environment and that depending upon an individual’s 
aversion to risk, he or she will evaluate all available risky alternatives accordingly (Anderson, 
Dillon, and Hardaker; Boisvert and McCarl; Hardaker, Huirne, and Anderson; and Robison and   4 
Barry).  There has been much research concerning how to simulate this decision-making process 
to aid producers in choosing strategies that are optimal to them.  The classic model for choice 
under uncertainty is the expected utility framework as proposed by Von Neuman and 
Morganstern.  In this framework, an individual will maximize utility subject to the probabilities 
of the occurrence of “good” or “bad” events.  While theoretically sound, this approach is very 
difficult to use in an applied sense, as it requires that the utility function of the decision maker be 
known and specified.  Since it is neither practical or, in some cases, even possible to specify 
decision makers’ utility functions, many alternative procedures have been developed to rank 
risky alternatives.  In general these approaches are designed to present a risk efficient set of 
choices, which is a subset of all available choices, and allow decision makers to choose from 
them.  Any alternative not in the risk efficient set is said to be risk dominated and should not be 
considered by the decision maker.  Two widely used techniques that follow this general 
framework are E-V analysis and stochastic dominance rules.   
E-V analysis (Markowitz, Freund) is very widely published in agricultural economic 
literature as means for ranking risky decisions.  However, there has been debate as to whether E-
V analysis is a theoretically appropriate method to represent optimal decision making.  It is 
generally agreed upon that expected utility theory (Von Neuman and Morganstern) provides the 
theoretical base for choice facing uncertainty.  E-V analysis is consistent with expected utility 
theory in three cases:  (1) the underlying income distribution is normal (Freund), (2) the 
distributions of the decision variable differ only by location and scale (Meyer 1987), and (3) the 
underlying utility function is quadratic (Markowitz, Tobin).  If any of one of these conditions is 
present it is generally agreed upon that E-V analysis is indeed consistent with expected utility   5 
theory.  In addition to a presence of many economic studies, empirical evidence demonstrates the 
closeness of E-V analysis to the expected utility maximizing choices (Levy and Markowitz). 
  In this study it is necessary, as mentioned earlier, to simulate livestock prices.  In general, 
prices are not expected to be normally distributed and therefore the returns associated with prices 
may or may not be normally distributed.  Furthermore, comparing a case of no price protection 
with purchasing a put option, which effectively truncates a distribution at a certain price (strike 
price – premium), ensures that the two alternatives do not differ only by location and scale.  
Given these shortcomings, only under the assumption of a quadratic utility function can E-V be 
expected to be consistent with expected utility theory.  This assumption is rather restrictive, 
given that it implies that absolute risk aversion increases as the level of payoff increases so that 
at some level marginal utility of wealth becomes negative (Robison and Barry; Hardaker, 
Huirne, and Anderson).  Even though these assumptions are not met, E-V analysis is still a 
strong analytical tool.  According to Robison and Barry its strengths beyond decision theory 
include relative ease in deriving optimal solutions and conducting equilibrium analysis and the 
natural relationship between the concepts of risk and variability and the statistical concept of 
variance.  Given these characteristics and the fact that this study aims only to rank the marketing 
alternatives and approximate the value producers might place on the subsidy, E-V analysis is an 
appropriate tool for analyzing the three alternatives outlined earlier.  If alternatives A and B are 
mutually exclusive and/or not correlated, they can be ranked by calculating the certainty 
equivalent (CE) or risk adjusted returns for each alternative using E-V analysis as follows: 
(1)          CEA  = E(A) - F(Var(A)) 
(2)          CEB  = E(B) - F(Var(B))   6 
where E(A) and E(B) are the expected values of A and B, respectively and Var(A) and Var(B) 
represent the variance of each.  F is a risk aversion coefficient.  If CEA > CEB then A dominates 
B, if the two are equal then both A and B might be in the risk efficient set of choices.  However, 
for two choices with equal expected returns, the one with the lower variance is preferred (i.e., the 
risk dominant choice). 
  Given that the assumptions required for E-V to be consistent with expected utility theory 
may not hold in this study, another test for dominance should be used to test the robustness of the 
E-v results.  For this reason, the choices will be analyzed using stochastic dominance (SD) 
criteria as a means of ranking livestock marketing strategies.  Three types of stochastic 
dominance are generally used to rank risky choices.  These are first degree stochastic dominance 
(FSD), second degree stochastic dominance (SSD), and stochastic dominance with respect to a 
function (SDRF) or generalized stochastic dominance (Meyer 1977).  SDRF is the most 
discriminatory and flexible test for risk dominance among the three SD criteria mentioned 
(Robison and Barry; Hardaker, Huirne, and Anderson).  Also, FSD and SSD can be shown to be 
special cases of SDRF (see Meyer for explanation).  These characteristics of SDRF make it the 
most robust and useful tool for this analysis.  FSD and SSD will be referred to in parts of the 
analysis but the reliance upon ranking choices will be placed upon SDRF. 
  Unlike E-V analysis, which is based solely on the first two moments of a distribution, SD 
criteria consider the entire distribution and therefore can generally deal with non-normality of the 
distributions involved.  This is because SD places fewer restrictions on the utility function of the 
decision maker and bases risk dominance on the entire cumulative distribution function (CDF) of 
each alternative.   7 
.
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SDRF, like E-V, introduces the advantages of knowing decisions makers preferences without 
actually eliciting utility functions.  This is accomplished by relying on the specification of upper 
(FU) and lower (FL) bounds of the Pratt risk aversion coefficient, which is often easier to 
estimate than a utility function (Hardaker, Huirne, and Anderson).  Assuming an individual has a 
utility function U(y), then the Pratt coefficient is equal to 
(3) 
 
Once L and U have been specified then a U(y) that minimizes 
(4) 
 
is found.  If the expression is positive then A is preferred to B.  If the expression is zero, SDRF 
cannot rank the two alternatives.  If the expression is negative, B might be preferred to A.  To 
verify this A(y) – B(y) is substituted into the brackets and the expression is reevaluated.  If the 
minimum of new expression is positive then B is definitely preferred to A.  If the expression is 
again negative, SDRF cannot rank the alternatives.   
  Both E-V and SDRF require the estimation of risk aversion coefficients.  McCarl and 
Bessler offer a method for calculating the Pratt risk aversion coefficient when the utility function 
is unknown.  In their formulation the decision maker is said to maximize the lower limit of a 
confidence interval from a normally distributed set of returns.  The formula is: 




2Z a = F  
where F= risk aversion parameter,  a Z = the standardized normal one-tailed Z value of an a 
level of significance, and  y S  is the relevant standard deviation under risk neutral returns.  This   8 
method will be used to estimate risk aversion coefficients for both E-V and SDRF.  Sy is 
represented by the standard deviation of the expected price assuming the producer does not 
attempt to manage price risk (this expected price will be defined in detail later in the paper) and 
Za will be specified from 5% to 95% in 2.5% increments.  In this formulation, Za = 50% is 
considered to be risk neutral while Za > 50% is risk averse and Za < 50% is risk preferring.  
Some of the extreme values of Za are not likely realistic levels of risk preference for agricultural 
producers but serve to illustrate how individuals of different levels of risk aversion respond to 
available choices. 
The ranking of the three aforementioned beef cattle marketing strategies will be 
completed in the following sections of this paper.  First, it will be necessary to specify the type of 
beef producer to be analyzed and make any necessary assumptions.  Then the alternatives of no 
price protection, fairly priced European put options and subsidized price insurance can be ranked 
using E-V and SDRF.  The results of all the analysis will then be reported and discussed with 
conclusions following this discussion. 
 
Analytical Procedure 
Assumptions Regarding the Livestock Producer 
To examine livestock production it is often necessary to limit the examination to a 
specific level of production.  This is because different levels of livestock production may require 
very different management practices and decision-making procedures.  For example, cow-calf 
producers must purchase breeding stock and expect to recover this investment over a period of a 
few years.  Backgrounders, on the other hand, purchase weaned calves (approximately 500 
pounds) and sell them to feedlots a few months later as feeder cattle (approximately 750 pounds).    9 
They are more concerned about short run prices and conditions than cow-calf producers.  For the 
purposes of this study, backgrounders will be used. 
  The assumption will be made that the backgrounder purchases weaned calves and will 
sell them in 150 days.  Therefore, the producer is concerned with the expected price of feeder 
cattle 150 days from the date of purchase.  One common method of estimating this expected 
price is the feeder cattle futures market contract.  Specifically, the price of the feeder cattle 
contract that will expire in roughly 150 days will represent the expected price for a producer with 
no price protection.  To accomplish the goals stated earlier, this study will approximate the risk 
associated with this expected price and offer two risk management strategies to determine 
producers’ willingness to adopt fairly priced European put options versus their willingness to 
adopt subsidized price insurance that is structured as a European put option. 
 
Simulation of Expected Prices 
To represent the risk associated with this expected price, it is necessary to further specify 
the distribution of possible prices.  Many investment consulting services report implied 
volatilities of futures market contracts.  These are usually calculated using Black’s formula for 
pricing futures options.  A known premium and strike level are used to solve for the implied 
volatility.  This measure of volatility represents the anticipated coefficient of variation of the 
distribution of possible prices for a contract.  It is then a matter of simple arithmetic to derive the 
standard deviation and variance for the distribution.  This study will use $88.50 / cwt the 
expected price and 11.0% as the volatility measure (which was level and implied volatility for 
the September feeder cattle futures contract as reported by PM Publishing Options Analysis in 
mid April).  This results in a standard deviation of $9.74 / cwt and a variance of 94.77.  As stated   10 
earlier, normally distributed prices are not commonly observed.  It is more likely that these 
prices will take on a distribution more similar to a gamma distribution.  Based on the first two 
moments of the distribution (mean and variance), a cumulative function of the gamma 
distribution can be fully specified.  This function can be inverted such that for a given 
probability, it returns a number that is expected to occur at that probability level in the gamma 
distribution.  By selecting 1000 random probabilities, ranking them in ascending order, and 
inserting them into the gamma distribution one at a time, an accurate representation of the 
distribution around the expected price can be obtained.  This distribution will represent the 
marketing alternative (Mo) of selling feeder cattle with no means of price protection. 
  Two risk management strategies will also be proposed.  The first will be fairly priced 
European put options (RM1).  These options can be purchased by producers to establish a price 
floor and can only be exercised at the time of maturity (i.e., approximately the sale date of the 
feeder cattle).  This alternative is simulated based on the first alternative.  A strike level and price 
are selected.  This study will use a 95% strike level, which translates into a $84.07 / cwt strike 
level or price floor.  With the first distribution ranked in ascending order each observation ni is 
evaluated.  If is it less than $84.07 / cwt then an indemnity payment (IPi) is added to it so that it 
equals $84.07 such that, 
(6)         
$84.07.     n     0     IP






To avoid complicating the analysis, the option premium will be calculated based on these actual 
payments rather than on an option pricing formula.  This premium (P) is calculated as: 





    P .   11 
In this formulation P is simply the average of all payments.  N is the total number of simulated 
prices and all other variables maintain their previous definitions.  This specification of P ensures 
that the total of all IPi equals the total of all P, thus the options are actuarially fair.  With the 
previously specified strike level, P = $2.02 / cwt.  At this point the price distribution for RM1 
can be specified by the operation: 
(8)          ni +  IPi – P "i. 
  The second risk management strategy (RM2) is government subsidized price insurance.  
This insurance will maintain the form of the European put option but producers will receive a 
subsidy (S) from the government that is a certain percentage of the premium.  Thus the 
distribution for RM2 becomes 
(9)          ni +  IPi – P + S(P) "i. 
In this study S = 50% ($1.01 / cwt) making the out-of-pocket expense for RM2 $1.01 / 
cwt.  It should be noted that this subsidy was chosen simply to represent the effects of a subsidy.  
Subsidies on crop insurance premiums are limited to 59% while the Dairy Options Pilot Program 
subsidizes 80% of dairy option premiums.  Based on these programs, subsidies on livestock 
insurance premiums could fall anywhere in the 59% to 80% range.  The descriptive statistics for 
all three alternatives are reported in Table 1 and the CDF of each is shown in Figure 1.  With the 
three choices clearly laid out, it is now possible to simulate producers’ acceptance of the 
alternatives by ranking the choices E-V and SD criteria. 
 
Ranking the Risky Alternatives 
  The ranking of   Mo, RM1, and RM2 will be accomplished in a two-step process.  First, 
only the choices of Mo and RM1 will be available to producers.  Under this scenario there are no   12 
government incentives that subsidize risk management.  A producer must choose to be fully to 
market risk or attempt to manage that risk at some cost determined by the futures market. 
The second scenario will compare Mo with RM2.  With government subsidies in place, RM1 
would still be a feasible alternative.  However, no rational decision maker would choose RM1.  
This is because RM2 dominates RM1 under the E-V framework for all values of F, since the 
variance of prices under each alternative but the expected price of RM2 is greater.  Furthermore, 
RM1 is dominated by RM2 in the sense of FSD.  This makes it unnecessary to even evaluate the 
two using SSD or SDRF since the results will hold (Robison and Barry).  In other words, for the 
second scenario anyone wishing to manage marketing risk would always choose RM2 over RM1 
and anyone wishing to take on that risk would always choose Mo, therefore RM1 is never in the 
risk efficient set.  The results of this ranking are presented and discussed in the following section. 
 
Results and Discussion 
  Scenarios 1 and 2 (Mo vs. RM1 and Mo vs. RM2, respectively) were analyzed using E-V 
and SDRF.  Computer software developed by Goh et. al was used to rank choices by SDRF.  
(See Goh et. al for a complete description of the software.)  In scenario 1 under both E-V and 
SDRF producers who are risk neutral or have any level of risk aversion will choose RM1.  That 
is, producers who maximize utility based on the income that they will realize at least 50% choose 
RM1.  The results of this comparison are reported in Table 2.  Not all levels of F are reported in 
the table.  For the omitted levels of risk aversion, the results were identical to the reported levels 
that would fall immediately before and after them.  For example, results for all levels F from 5% 
to 30% are the same.  It should be noted that FSD cannot discern between M0 and RM1.  This is   13 
because the CDF’s cross (see Figure 1).  However in terms of SSD, RM1 is dominant since all 
risk averse producers prefer RM1.   
In Scenario 1 the results of the two methods of ranking choices are the same.  It has been shown 
that under normally distributed returns E-V and SSD (SDRF where 0 £ F £ + 4) are equivalent.  
In this application, even though the distributions of expected prices are non-normal, the two 
methods are still consistent with each other.  On the other hand, the responses of the two 
methods to the introduction of a subsidy are noticeably different. 
  One interesting and expected effect of a subsidy on the purchase of insurance is that 
individuals who previously received no marginal benefit from the managing the risk of their 
respective operations now realize a benefit and therefore purchase insurance.  Both methods of 
ranking the choices show this. The results of the comparison of Scenario 2 are reported in Table 
2.  However, SDRF indicates that a greater amount of producers who would not choose RM1 in 
scenario 1 choose RM2 in second scenario.  This is because a greater range of risk attitudes now 
prefers subsidized insurance.  This difference in the two techniques is shown in Table 3.  These 
differences are due to the fact that SDRF bases decisions on the entire distribution of each 
alternative and E-V on the first two moments.  SSRF recognizes, to some degree, that mainly 
downside risk is being foregone and therefore even individuals with only a slight aversion to risk 
would be better off utilizing RM1.  E-V merely recognizes that the variance has decreased at the 
expense of a decreased expected price and judges the tradeoff accordingly with no regard to the 
type of risk that has been mitigated.  It should be noted that both E-V and SDRF show that risk-
preferring individuals would actually purchase the price insurance when it is subsidized.  Under 
both techniques, these are individuals who prefer more risk to less because they are willing to 
weather the volatility of a marketing strategy due to the chance of large payoffs at times.   14 
  As mentioned earlier, the E-V approach calculates an individual’s CE (or risk-adjusted 
returns) for a given situation.  Given this CE it is possible to approximate the willingness to pay 
by producers of different risk attitudes for RM1 and RM2.  As mentioned earlier, there are some 
theoretical concerns in using E-V as an empirical tool in this specific case, so these 
measurements should be considered approximations.  It should also be noted that this willingness 
to pay assumes that RM1 and RM2 are the only marketing strategies available to livestock 
producers and that they are mutually exclusive.  This does not drastically limit the discussion as 
this study looks to identify broad trends in the effects of subsidized livestock price insurance on 
risk faced by producers. 
  E-V analysis can be used to calculate the willingness to pay for both RM1 and RM2.  
Willingness to pay for RM1 and RM2 can be determined by comparing the CE of Mo with that of  
RM1 and RM2, respectively, assuming that RM1 and RM2 were free.  That is, equations 8 and 9 
were modified to leave out the (–P) term.  The CE of Mo was then subtracted from each.  The 
result is the premium amount that a person of each risk attitude will forgo to utilize the risk 
management strategy.  These measures of willingness to pay are shown in Table 4.  As expected, 
the CE (and therefore willingness to pay) increases by the amount of the subsidy.  This is 
because a producer can now realize the same expected price variance as with RM1 but now 
realize a higher expected price.  This means that RM2 actually has a lower absolute volatility 
(C.V.) than RM1 (see Table 1).  All individuals who did not wish to purchase RM1 and for 
whom this increase in CE results in a willingness to pay that is > P will now purchase RM2.  It is 
also true that any individual whose CE is >P in scenario 1 would choose to purchase RM1.  E-V 
analysis allows these changes in willingness to pay to be examined for all levels of risk aversion.   15 
The case of the risk aversion level of 47.5% provides an interesting example of how the marginal 
benefit that comes from managing risk is affected by the subsidy.  In scenario 1, an individual 
with risk preference level of 47.5% would be willing to pay only $1.36 / cwt for RM1 and if 
forced to pay P for RM1 would realize a marginal benefit of -$0.66 / cwt (willingness to pay – 
P).  Under Scenario 2 the same individual is willing to pay P for RM2 and receives a marginal 
benefit ($0.35 / cwt) from doing so.  The same procedure can be used for all levels of risk 
aversion to see this change in marginal benefit.  The group of producers whose risk aversion 
level is greater than 50% were already receiving some marginal benefit from paying P to utilize 
RM1 as a marketing strategy.  Their marginal benefits now increase by the full subsidy amount.  
Since the subsidy is based on the premium, this increase in marginal benefit is directly related to 
the amount of risk present.  For example, this analysis assumed an 11.11% volatility of expected 
price, which is appropriate for a feeder cattle contract only 5 months out.  If a producer were to 
insure a year in advance volatility around the expected price might be as high as 18%.  This 
would result in a fair premium of $4.30 and a subsidy of $2.15.  For the riskier situation, the 
subsidy is greater.  This indicates that, as long as the subsidy is based on a percentage of the 
premium, producers in riskier situations will receive a greater benefit from the subsidy. 
  These results show, as anticipated, that offering a subsidized insurance product could 
very well effect the decision-making process of certain producers, depending upon their risk 
attitude.  In general the subsidy obviously makes RM2 more attractive than RM1 to all 
producers.  However, for many producers, the difference is enough to actually change their 
optimal risk management strategy from doing nothing to purchasing price insurance. 
   16 
Summary and Conclusions 
  Livestock producers, like all agricultural decision makers, will choose production and 
marketing practices that maximize their individual utilities.  The feasible production and 
marketing practices will, in general, have some level of uncertainty associated with them.  How 
an individual evaluates these feasible alternatives to maximize utility is a function, in part, of his 
or her aversion to risk (Anderson, Dillon, and Hardaker, Boisvert and McCarl; and Hardaker, 
Huirne, and Anderson, Robison and Barry).  This study focused on marketing risk and basically 
ignored production risk (and all other sources of risk) during the analysis.  In the case of a 
backgrounder looking to sell feeder cattle in roughly 5 months, the marketing risk or uncertainty 
is the feeder cattle price fluctuation over that 5 months.  In the real world, producers can 
purchase European options to establish a price floor thus mitigating the downside feeder cattle 
price fluctuations.  This study introduced this marketing alternative (with options being priced 
based on the actual distribution of expected prices) along with the alternative of not managing 
price risk in Scenario 1.  Next, in Scenario 2, subsidized insurance, in the form of subsidized 
European options was offered along with the do nothing strategy as alternatives.  For both 
scenarios the optimal choice for a variety of risk aversion levels was chosen using E-V analysis 
and SDRF.  The differences in the two scenarios were interesting and highlighted the effects of a 
subsidy on the risk faced by livestock producers. 
  In Scenario 2, a wider range risk attitudes, including risk preferring individuals, found 
price risk management appealing.  This was true for both ranking techniques.  It could also be 
shown with the E-V results that the marginal benefit that producers realize from managing price 
risk is increased by the subsidy amount.  This is evident in the increased willingness to pay for 
subsidized insurance compared to fairly priced options (see Table 4).  It is easy to see how these   17 
two components could be of concern to policy makers.  If individuals who have an inherent 
desire to seek risk (i.e., F < 0) now realize a positive marginal benefit from purchasing 
insurance, it is conceivable that they will use this as means to finance the taking on of additional 
risk.  This practice can result in producers bearing as much or more risk as they did before the 
subsidy was introduced.  Furthermore, the very presence of this subsidy as rent to be collected by 
livestock producers can change the structure of livestock production.  If rational decision makers 
realize that this rent is available to them only if they produce livestock, then livestock production 
may then become a desirable (possibly optimal) method of earning income.  If producers are 
attracted only by this rent, they may or may not have the management skills to run a livestock 
operation.  In these cases subsidies could go to fund livestock price risk management that is 
being used in lieu of sound management practices. 
  These are only some of the possible general effects of subsidized livestock insurance.  It 
is beyond the scope of this study to attempt to quantify or even identify with certainty production 
responses to subsidized insurance.  However, by using proven and accepted tools for evaluating 
risky decision making and by observing past instances in the crop sector, as this paper has done, 
it is possible inform decision makers about what these general changes might be. 
If the additional benefits realized due to the subsidy are used to invest in increasing 
feeder cattle production, there are likely to be noticeable changes in beef cattle production.  For 
example, when market prices for beef are low enough, a decrease in the quantity of finished 
cattle (cattle ready for slaughter) occurs.  This results in a decreased demand for feeder cattle by 
feedlots which translates into lower feeder cattle prices.  In this case the backgrounders 
examined in this study would now be willing to pay less than before for weaned calves.  As a 
response to this cow-calf producers are likely to liquidate herds to some degree and decrease calf   18 
production.  Unless there is a change in consumer demand for beef, this decrease in production 
by the entire sector is eventually realized at the slaughter level and prices begin to recover.  
While this cycle is less defined in recent years it can still be observed in beef productions. 
With subsidies on price insurance in place, backgrounders (and other levels of 
productions) would now be responding to signals that are based on receiving this subsidy, in 
addition to market signals.  They might find that there is no reason to cut back production so 
quickly when prices are declining since they are guaranteed the subsidy in addition to a price 
floor.  If feeder cattle production was kept at higher levels than the market would normally 
support there would be more finished cattle and, subsequently, more beef than the market 
demands.  This excess supply could serve to keep beef prices and cattle prices at other levels of 
production low for prolonged periods of time.  Simultaneously, production would be at 
abnormally high levels.  Furthermore, individual livestock producers might utilize riskier 
management and/or production strategies given their expectations of receiving the subsidy. 
Taxpayer dollars in the form of subsidies would be financing livestock production that, 
otherwise, would not be taking place. 
It is beyond the scope of this study to attempt to quantify these supply responses.  
However, the tools used to identify and explain the general trends in supply response are well 
established and accepted methods of analyzing risk.  Therefore, the conclusions drawn here are 
based on sound economic analysis and should serve as a starting point for critically evaluating 
the effects of subsidizing livestock insurance.   19 
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics of Three Price Distributions of Feeder Cattle Marketing 
Alternatives 
 
  Mean  Standard Dev  C.V. 
  ($ / cwt)  ($ / cwt)  (%) 
 
No Price  
Protection  88.50  9.834  11.11   
 
Fairly Priced  
European Options  88.50  7.396  8.38   
 
Government  




Table 2.  Risk Efficient Marketing Alternatives for Livestock Producers of Varying Risk 
Attitudes 
 
Risk Aversion  Risk Aversion  Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
Level  Coefficient  E-V  SDRF  E-V  SDRF 
 
5%  -0.33455  Mo  Mo  Mo  Mo 
30%  -0.10657  Mo  Mo  Mo  Mo 
40%  -0.05145  Mo  Mo  Mo  RM2 
42.5%  -0.03864  Mo  Mo  Mo  RM2 
45%  -0.02562  Mo  Mo  Mo  RM2 
47.5%  -0.01780  Mo  Mo  RM2  RM2 
50%  0.0  RM1  RM1  RM2  RM2 
52.5%  0.01780  RM1  RM1  RM2  RM2 
55%  0.02562  RM1  RM1  RM2  RM2 
57.5  0.03864  RM1  RM1  RM2  RM2 
60%  0.05145  RM1  RM1  RM2  RM2 
62.5%  0.06508  RM1  RM1  RM2  RM2 
65%  0.07830  RM1  RM1  RM2  RM2 
67.5  0.09231  RM1  RM1  RM2  RM2 
70%  0.10657  RM1  RM1  RM2  RM2 
72.5%  0.12202  RM1  RM1  RM2  RM2 
75%  0.13728  RM1  RM1  RM2  RM2 
77.5%  0.15361  RM1  RM1  RM2  RM2 
87.5%  0.23388  RM1  RM1  RM2  RM2 
95%  0.33455  RM1  RM1  RM2  RM2 
Note:  Scenario 1 Mo indicates the marketing strategy of doing nothing to manage price risk, RM1 and RM2 indicate 
purchasing fairly priced European put options and subsidized insurance, respectively.  In Scenario 1only Mo  and 
RM1 are available.  In Scenario 2 Mo and RM2 are compared.  E-V is Expected Value Variance analysis and SDRF 
is Stochastic Dominance with Respect to a Function.   22 
Table 3.  Risk Seekers for Which Subsidized Insurance is a Risk Efficient Choice While 
Fairly Priced European Options are Not 
 
Risk Aversion  Risk Aversion  E-V  SDRF 
Level  Coefficient 
 
5%  -0.33455   
30%  -0.10657   
40%  -0.05145    X 
42.5%  -0.03864    X 
45%  -0.02562    X 
47.5%  -0.01780  X  X 
Note:  E-V is Expected Value Variance analysis and SDRF is Stochastic Dominance with Respect to a Function.  X 
denotes that no price risk management was preferred to fairly priced European options while subsidized insurance is 
preferred to no price risk management. 
 
 
Table 4.  Willingness to Pay for Fairly Priced European Put Options and Subsidized Price 
Insurance 
Risk Aversion  Risk Aversion  Fairly Priced   Subsidized 
Level  Coefficient  European Put Options  Price Insurance 
    ($ / cwt)  ($ / cwt) 
 
5%  -0.33455  -11.30  -10.29 
30%  -0.10657  -2.19  -1.18 
40%  -0.05145  0.01  1.02 
42.5%  -0.03864  0.52  1.53 
45%  -0.02562  1.04  2.05 
47.5%  -0.01780  1.36  2.37 
50%  0.0  2.07  3.08 
52.5%  0.01780  2.78  3.79 
55%  0.02562  3.09  4.10 
57.5  0.03864  3.61  4.62 
60%  0.05145  4.12  5.13 
62.5%  0.06508  4.67  5.68 
65%  0.07830  5.20  6.21 
67.5  0.09231  5.76  6.77 
70%  0.10657  6.33  7.34 
72.5%  0.12202  6.94  7.96 
75%  0.13728  7.55  8.57 
77.5%  0.15361  8.21  9.22 
87.5%  0.23388  11.42  12.43 
95%  0.33455  15.44  16.45   23 
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